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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

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TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

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SUBJECTS :

OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAM

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HARVEY EX 1 R371

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JG 21 JUN 94 Project Z R R I F L E

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D. ~~pure~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~the~~ post for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is to keep the
code and cipher material in accordance with
requirements levied on the clandestine services, ~~particularly~~
~~the National Security Agency~~. Since these requirements are
subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would
be valid for the duration of the project. Specific
operations will be mounted on the basis of need and
opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division
D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Bathymoecus

needed.

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3. Background : In response to the increasing requirements

for the protection of graveyards of slaves, colored people.

Meanwhile, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of

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Project assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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period requirements [from USA] became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [which] [and does not deal with NCA] or [priorities requirements], could best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the ODA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the [Intelligence Bureau] [the Chief of Station, Vancouver], in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~as~~ to sporadically [the CIA, Vancouver], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. On ~~September~~ ^{October} 1960,

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Q fjuin annual salary : [#] 7,200

Travel + ops expenses for

Q fjuin + other agents + agent candidates : 2,000

Fees for services by and
standing of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000

Travel of staff employees &
engaged in Zorifle activity : 2,000

Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000

14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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1) Legal, ethical → moral, operational problems; political: non-attributable
bilateral.

2) Our own expertise (~~in English~~) (+ efficient D.P.) and experience
w/ KGB (~~including, Russia, Europe, America~~) → require most
professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,
CE-experienced opc officers (few available), able to conduct patient
search & willing to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him
he should, + w/param high regard for operational security.
Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does ~~the American~~ now
know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control,
search, tracing, case officiating, etc. - D.P. authority
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous
cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility
of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with
own ~~or~~ (non-bilateral) commo. Word of mouth +
no bulletins re trips
(except for breach)

d. No PA's, or intermediaries; rigid case-officing
from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign
govts. | REU

f. No use of ~~any~~ ^{any} agent who
ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Training
by opposition would never..

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,

~~Moskow~~ in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

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pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretend: ~~intelligence~~ search; this establishes ~~base~~.
j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until
ready to go if it all fails.

4. Blackmail:

- a. No American citizens or residents or
people who ever obtained U.S. visa.
b. No chain of connections: strictly person to
person; singleton ops.
c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.
d. Exclude organizations ~~involved~~, those
w/record of arrests, those of ineligibility of purpose
as criminals.
e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for
blowing cover or backs in case of blow.

- f. Testing of nominees essential: no following directions,
security, blackmail.
g. Former resistance personnel a possibility.
h. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise
will just be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such
as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

→ 9. ~~Should have planned 20 days to blacktop May, 1975~~

~~Document from [redacted] CIA [redacted]~~

~~Accts file~~

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. ~~He loves thorine.~~

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Keepng of files.

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for clandestine travel

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Legal; operational + ethical → morale problems.

Notable case.

Case not secure enough.

1) Maximum security + within Harbor only (e.g., how much does [redacted] know now?). Limitation on number of [redacted]

[redacted] - [redacted]. Guise of [redacted] objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point nowhere. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-station) commos.

3) Every operation to be negligibly case-officed; no silk-shirt PAs.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizen or American resident for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of [redacted] case officers who can pass as foreigners - and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selected in home territory.

7) Avoid disclosure w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Spain) has been examined.

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8) Planning should include provision for blinding Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. i.e. if above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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10) ~~Conveniences recommended.~~ ~~Marketing candidate~~

~~Walter~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (All archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ^{All} Cuban personnel involved should have some C.E. experience.

14) ~~Silent, unobtrusive + stable in~~

15) What are limits on team or individuals solo selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) Too dangerous of standbys.

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26/1 - 25/1 - eye action
 "the magic button"
 narcotics Büro [redacted] 8
 "for a living" - RIS 201 cover
 Crutis - Bankruptcy - no store
 eyes - Jim A. Contract
 not a TSD problem from U-2

② Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort
 - Confession of weakness -
 - El Benefactor → Assumptions -
 Example 3 "mug"

Framework of [redacted] job
 Memo • [redacted]

[redacted] bear

REC'D - [redacted]

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Anesthesia -

26/1 - [redacted] Farfante 001 - Matter -
 no file Review - [redacted]

1. Select proper open to run -

2. [redacted] max w/ 2

3. Security Rules

B-WH-1-AS-³

4. Missives

[redacted] Reserv.

d:32281946 Page 12 Resort - Brakes - Select to b - b-ka

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6. No [redacted]
7. No projects or papers
except for cones.
8. Principal Agent - [redacted]?
[redacted] Project Draft FCH -
Ticket 1500 - from N.B.
mask spot regn - self st
Project - abz Disko
9. Dispersal -
10. Targets who & where -
Must know before
we can spot -

11. Case officering

12.

13.

7d List - Remember

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